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A Game Theoretic Analysis of Marbury v. Madison: The Origins 
of Judicial Review 
 
 
Daniel deButts 
 
 
 
Introduction to Marbury v. Madison 
 
 The Supreme Court of the United States is arguably one of 
the United States’ most powerful institutions despite its 
constitutional limitations. The Court and its nine justices have the 
authority to overturn any legislative action, once it is challenged. In 
the past fifty years, the Court has ruled on abortion laws, gay 
marriage, and many other significant political, social, and economic 
issues. Many assume that such powers were written into the very 
fabric of the Constitution, yet this is not the case. Despite our 
common understanding of the Court’s current powers, some lack the 
historical context to appreciate the string of strategic moves that 
Chief Justice John Marshall and his adversary—and cousin—
President Thomas Jefferson made over two hundred years ago. 
 In the years immediately following the ratification of the 
United States Constitution, the Supreme Court had negligible 
influence in the country. Justices were forced to travel by carriage 
to different states and often settled simple discrepancies among local 
farmers. This, surely, is not the Court we know today. Presently, we 
know the Court almost exclusively for its ability to review 
legislature and rule it unconstitutional—a process known as judicial 
review. 
In 1800, the Federalists lost both the presidency and their 
majority in Congress in a series of landslide victories to the 
Antifederalists. Lame duck President John Adams and his Federalist 
Congress decided to expand the Judiciary Act of 1793 and appoint 
several dozen federal judges in an effort to maintain Federalist 
power in the central government. The commissions for these 
“Midnight Judges” were given to Secretary of State John Marshall 
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to be issued as quickly as possible. Nonetheless, in what is often 
described as a race against the clock, several of the judges, among 
them William Marbury, were never given their commissions, as the 
government changed hands to the Anti-federalists. President 
Jefferson, upon taking office, immediately ordered his Secretary of 
State James Madison not to issue the remaining commissions. The 
waiting judges would never receive their positions. Of course, 
Jefferson’s disdain for the judiciary is well-documented. In 1820, he 
wrote in a personal letter, “the Judiciary of the US is the subtle corps 
of sappers & miners constantly working underground to undermine 
the foundations of our confederated fabric.”1 
 In the wake of Jefferson’s decision, Marbury filed suit 
against Madison at the US Supreme Court and requested a writ of 
mandamus, an order for the government to properly perform its 
duties.2 According to Section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1793, the 
Supreme Court had original jurisdiction over federal requests writ 
of mandamus. With the support of other Federalists, Marbury 
demanded that Jefferson hand over the commission, so he could 
become a Justice of the Peace in Washington, D.C. In a surprising 
turn of events, the Anti-Federalist Congress decided to disband the 
Supreme Court for their entire 1802 session.3 
 After a full year, the Court met again, and within a few days 
Marshall declared that Marbury v. Madison (1803) would be heard. 
Marshall knew that Jefferson was a strict Anti-Federalist who did 
not want to see the powers of the judiciary expanded. Furthermore, 
he found it possible that Jefferson would simply ignore any ruling 
that wasn’t in his favor. After all, Jefferson did not issue the initial 
commissions in the first place, despite the legal murkiness of the 
situation. Thus, as he heard the case in the spring of 1803, Marshall 
found himself trapped between two difficult decisions—issue the 
mandamus and run the risk of being ignored by the executive, 
effectively destroying what little authority the Court had or yield to 
Jefferson and the executive branch, and similarly demonstrate the 
weakness of the Court.4  
After careful deliberation, Marshall and the Court reached a 
unanimous 4-0 decision (there were only six judges on the Court at 
the time, two of which were not present for the case). Marshall 
decided that although Jefferson should be required to hand over the 
commissions to Marbury and the rest of the ‘Midnight Judges,’ the 
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Supreme Court had no real authority to issue such a ruling. Marshall 
asserted that Marshall asserted, according to the Constitution, the 
Supreme Court only has original jurisdiction over “all cases 
affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those 
in which a state shall be a party. In all other cases, the Supreme 
Court shall have appellate jurisdiction.”5 Effectively, Marshall 
scolded Jefferson for breaking the law, but said that the Court was 
powerless to help Marbury. He declared Section 13 of the Judiciary 
Act of 1793 unconstitutional. In his own language, “a law repugnant 
to the Constitution is void, and that courts, as well as other 
departments, are bound by that instrument” and, further, “it is 
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say 
what the law is.”6 Despite not getting the Federalist judges in office, 
Marshall managed to strengthen the Court’s powers in the long-run. 
A frustrated Jefferson, in a personal letter following the decision, 
retorted: “our peculiar security is in the possession of a written 
constitution. Let us not make it a blank paper by construction.”7 The 
author of that construction, of course, is Jefferson’s cousin—John 
Marshall. The tension between the relatives would only continue to 
rise. In a maneuver that changed the United States forever, Chief 
Justice John Marshall outdueled President Thomas Jefferson with a 
strategic move bound for the annals of history. 
 
Introduction to Game Theory 
 
 Game Theory, a field developed in the early twentieth 
century by the famous mathematician John von Neumann, is the 
analysis of interactive decision making between two or more players 
in a strategic game. Often, people acquire experience with game 
theory by way of playing strategic games. For example, dating is 
often a strategic game, as players must calculate payoffs based on 
sets of decisions: Should one take their date to dinner? Bring 
flowers? Go to a movie? All such decisions result in varying payoffs 
based on how their opponent—in this case, their date—will react to 
such moves.8 Applying such concepts to a broader scale allows 
economists to analyze behavior within industries, politicians to 
consider constituents’ reactions to certain regulations, and athletes 
to predict their opponents’ move on the fly. All such applications 
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are starkly different, yet equally valid in their use of game theoretic 
analysis.  
 This paper will discuss terms such as game tree, rollback 
equilibrium, and payoffs. In order to use these terms fluidly, it will 
define these terms with the help of Dixit et al.9 In the appendix to 
this paper are three game trees. Dixit defines a game tree as “a 
representation of a game in the form of nodes, branches, and 
terminal nodes and their associated payoffs.” It is important to note 
that game trees denote sequential games, in which players move one 
at a time. A rollback equilibrium is a set of strategies “that remain 
after rollback analysis has been used to prune all the branches that 
can be pruned.” In its latter sections, this paper shall explain the 
rollback analysis of Marbury v. Madison in explicit detail. Next, it 
is essential to understand that a payoff is considered to be “the 
objective, usually numerical, that a player in a game aims to 
maximize.” Payoffs are the key to performing a proper rollback 
analysis of any game tree and will be discussed extensively in this 
paper. For the purposes of this analysis, the payoffs are calculated 
in “preference order”—meaning, each payoff is listed in ranking 
order of the player’s preferred outcome. 
 
Prior Game-Theoretical Analysis of Marbury v. Madison 
 
 There is one major paper in the field that discusses Marbury 
v. Madison from a game theoretic perspective. The paper, by Robert 
Lowry Clinton, takes the stance that the Jefferson-Marshall battle 
was less a battle and more a “tacit political compromise between 
two figures who have most often been considered mortal 
enemies…not a ‘game’ with a clear winner and loser.”10 This 
concept is backed by Clinton’s structuring of payoffs. In preference 
order, Clinton considers Marshall’s decision to reject the mandamus 
and declare the Judiciary Act of 1793 unconstitutional as equally 
preferred between the two actors. He assigns it a three (the second 
highest preference). In turn, Clinton believes that Marshall’s highest 
payoff (a score of four) occurs when he issues the Mandamus and 
Jefferson complies. Both of these payoff structures indicate that 
Clinton gives more weight to the appointment of judges for both 
actors than to the restructuring of government authority—either in 
terms of executive expansion or establishment or judicial review.  
4
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 Another relevant paper, written by Jack Knight and Lee 
Epstein, reaches beyond the scope of this paper; however, it still 
incorporates useful analysis of the Jefferson-Marshall battle. The 
authors widen the scope of the game to the point where Jefferson 
threatens Marshall with impeachment prior to the hearing of 
Marbury v. Madison. Knight and Epstein’s paper primarily focuses 
on the struggle for judicial supremacy, as suggested by its title, and 
simply uses Marshall versus Jefferson as a means of portraying that 
struggle. At multiple points leading up to Marbury v. Madison, 
Jefferson tried to force Marshall out of the Court. According to the 
paper, Jefferson viewed Marshall as a “subtly calculating enemy of 
the people” and a man “of strong political ambitions, capable of 
bending others to his will, determined to mobilize the power of the 
court by craftiness…and by making its opinion those of a conclave 
which he would dominate.”11 This appears to contradict directly 
Clinton’s supposition that Marshall and Jefferson made a relatively 
amicable, joint decision to establish judicial review. Knight and 
Epstein go so far as to say that “the new president had nothing but 
contempt for the new Chief Justice.” Furthermore, the paper states 
that Marshall knew that the Anti-Federalists wanted him impeached. 
If this were the case, it would strengthen Marshall’s fear of 
upholding the mandamus, and payoffs should be adjusted 
accordingly. This paper differentiates between two classes of 
motivations: the political and the institutional. To clarify, ‘political’ 
refers to the actors’ parties (Federalist and Anti-Federalist) and their 
goals, and ‘institutional’ refers to the actors’ goals and desires for 
the long-term function of the government. Knight and Epstein 
conclude that Jefferson preferred (1) that the judgeships be voided 
and (2) that the size of government be maintained or, preferably, 
reduced. On the other hand, Marshall preferred (1) that the 
Federalists fill the judgeships and (2) that the size of government be 
expanded and, more specifically, that the judicial branch bolster its 
authority. These distinctions are important and must be factored into 
a single payoff structure. Later, this paper shall discuss the 
parameters of preference for both Jefferson and Marshall and how 
the ‘political’ and ‘institutional’ goals are given weight in a payoff 
calculation. 
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A Novel Analysis of Marbury v. Madison 
 
 To properly review all aspects of this paper’s revised game 
tree for Marbury v. Madison, this paper will first describe the 
structure of the game trees attached in the appendices to this paper—
Appendix A, Appendix B, and Appendix C. In analyzing the game 
between Jefferson and Marshall, this paper shows that they played 
the game with asymmetric information in which Marshall has 
complete information on the structure of the game—or, arguably, a 
second-mover advantage, which will be explained in greater 
detail—and Jefferson lacks a specific information set that is critical 
to the outcome of the game. First, this paper will look at the structure 
of the trees, then analyze the payoffs (which are identical in all three 
games) and, lastly, perform a rollback analysis of the game.  
The game begins with Marbury’s decision to sue Madison 
for his commission. Jefferson has two choices: to issue the 
commissions to the remaining midnight judges or not to issue them. 
If he chooses to issue the commissions, then the game is complete, 
and Marshall has no further moves, since there are no grounds for a 
legal case. If, however, Jefferson does not issue the commissions, 
Marshall then has the opportunity to hear the case in the Supreme 
Court. Here, from Jefferson’s perspective at the beginning of the 
game, Marshall has two choices: issue the requested writ of 
mandamus or reject it. If Marshall rejects the mandamus, then it is 
apparent to all parties that the game would be over, for Jefferson 
would be satisfied with the decision and not take further action. On 
the other hand, if Marshall upholds the mandamus, Jefferson then 
has the option to either overrule the Court and ignore the ruling or 
uphold the mandamus, concede to the Court, and deliver the 
commissions. In either case, the game ends there. The third option 
for Marshall, denoted by the dotted line (to represent the asymmetric 
information set), is unbeknownst to Jefferson at the beginning of the 
game: Marshall can simultaneously reject the mandamus and rule 
that the Judiciary Act of 1793 was unconstitutional, or as he 
succinctly concluded his lengthy decision, “the rule must be 
discharged.”12 
 The important claim here is that Jefferson lacked 
information from the beginning. Clinton, in his analysis, believes 
this is not the case: “it must appear less likely that Jefferson and 
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Madison would have been incognizant of the alternatives available 
to the Court, and so less likely that Jefferson would have allowed 
himself to be outpointed by the chief justice in the situation.” In his 
paper, Clinton bases this conjecture off the fact that Charles Lee, 
part of Marbury’s representation in Court, remarked during the oral 
arguments, “Congress is not restrained from conferring original 
jurisdiction in other cases than those mentioned in the constitution.” 
This excerpt appears to envisage Marshall’s crafty decision; 
however, it does not support Clinton’s claim that Jefferson knew 
about the unconstitutionality of Section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 
1793. In fact, this could only possibly support the notion that 
Charles Lee knew at the time, which, of course, means that during 
oration, Marshall and Jefferson may have learned of the opportunity 
to claim unconstitutionality for the first time. This paper makes no 
claim as to that fact; but this insight could have led to a supposed 
“second-mover advantage.” If Marshall and Jefferson both learned 
of the unconstitutionality at the same time (during oration), then the 
choice only presented itself during Marshall’s turn, which allowed 
him greater flexibility in his decision-making process and 
simultaneously limited Jefferson’s ability to make rational choices 
at the beginning of the game.  
This turns out to be the single most important event in the 
game. This paper argues that had Jefferson known about Marshall’s 
third option, he would have readily chosen to issue the commissions 
in the first place.  
In Appendices A, B, and C, the structure of the tree and the 
payoffs are exactly the same. In each appendix, however, the 
rollback analysis is changed, and, therefore, so is the final result of 
the game. In Appendix A, the tree is viewed from Jefferson’s 
perspective; in Appendix B, the tree is constructed based on how 
Jefferson would have acted if he had known about the missing 
information set; and in Appendix C, the game is shown as Jefferson 
and Marshall truly played it in 1803. 
Now, because the payoffs stay the same in each Appendix, 
this paper will argue for the structure of the payoffs here. As you 
refer to the table in the bottom right corner of each appendix, you 
will see that the top letters refer to Jefferson (J) and Marshall (M). 
These correspond to the letters at every decision node. Furthermore, 
7
deButts: The Origins of Judicial Review
Published by W&M ScholarWorks, 2019
 8 
the payoffs are ranked in preference order; a payoff of four is most 
preferable to the actor, while a payoff of zero is least preferable.  
It is widely known that the Founding Fathers knew that their 
actions would set precedents far into the future. George Washington 
was once quoted as saying, “there is scarcely any part of my conduct 
which may not be hereafter drawn into precedent.”13 It is not hard to 
extrapolate from this quote that many of the framers, including 
Jefferson and Marshall, had a very similar mindset. It has been said 
that Marshall, in understanding the weight of his positions, 
“invented, in an era without precedent, the legal principle that 
form[s] the foundations of American constitutional and international 
law today.”14 At the time, our young democracy was just starting to 
establish precedents in every facet of government—and Marshall 
and Jefferson knew it. 
With that in mind, a relatively incontestable payoff structure 
can be established, which allows us to continue with the rollback 
analysis of the game. Two items have been taken into consideration: 
first, that the two players care most about the long-term function of 
the government; and second, that the two players have different 
desires to appoint or not to appoint Federalist Justices of the Peace. 
The payoffs are listed according to preference order; thus, a zero is 
least preferable and a four is most preferable. The payoff tables are 
constant across all appendices and their tables.  
Starting with Jefferson’s payoffs, a four is assigned to the 
outcome in which Jefferson does not issue the commissions and 
Marshall rejects the mandamus. This is Jefferson’s best payoff 
because the government does not expand its judicial or executive 
authority, and the Justices of the Peace are not issued their 
commissions. As mentioned before, Jefferson did not particularly 
like the judiciary branch; he is quoted as saying that “the judiciary 
bodies were supposed to the most helpless members of the 
government…experience, however, soon showed in what way they 
were to become the most dangerous.”15 Presumably, Jefferson’s 
“experience” –– presumably his interaction with Marshall in 
Marbury v. Madison  –– demonstrated the strength of the Court. 
Jefferson’s next best outcome occurs when he issues the 
commissions (a value of three), in the first place. This payoff 
deviates from Clinton’s structure, and that is because in this 
outcome, Jefferson cedes the judgeships, but neither the executive 
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nor the judiciary are expanded. After that, Jefferson’s third best 
outcome (a value of two) happens when Jefferson does not issue the 
commissions, Marshall upholds the mandamus, and then Jefferson 
overrules Marshall’s verdict. This is good for Jefferson that the 
judges are not put into place, yet it is certainly worse than the 
previous outcome because the precedent is now set for the executive 
branch to have the authority to overrule the judiciary. In the long-
term, the Supreme Court will be exceptionally weak, but the 
executive powers will have expanded. From Jefferson’s Anti-
Federalist perspective, any imbalance or expansion of federal power 
is considered a negative outcome. Jefferson’s second worst outcome 
comes when he does not issue the commission, Marshall upholds the 
mandamus, and Jefferson yields to the Court (a value of one). This 
is a near-disaster for Jefferson because the justices of the peace are 
given their commissions, and the Supreme Court establishes 
authority over the executive branch. In doing so, the formerly weak 
Supreme Court is now a source of authority. Surely, Jefferson would 
have loathed this possibility. Lastly, Jefferson would have had the 
least preference for the true historical outcome (a value of zero). In 
this scenario, Jefferson does not issue the commissions, and then 
Marshall rejects the mandamus and concurrently establishes judicial 
review by declaring the Judiciary Act of 1793 unconstitutional. Here 
Marshall vastly expands the power of the judiciary and shifts the 
balance of power in government unlike any other outcome. 
Although the judges are not appointed, Jefferson still does not prefer 
to have the governmental structure reorganized and skewed toward 
the judicial branch.  
From Marshall’s perspective, the payoffs are almost 
perfectly reversible. Marshall’s most preferable outcome is to 
establish judicial review (a value of four). As mentioned earlier, 
Marshall was a staunch advocate of the Supreme Court and of 
Federalist ideologies, thus the establishment of judicial review is his 
best outcome. Next, he would prefer that Jefferson not issue the 
commissions, then Marshall would uphold the mandamus, and 
finally Jefferson would agree to issue the commissions (a value of 
three). This is Marshall’s second-most preferred outcome because 
the power of the judiciary is respected by Jefferson and the 
judgeships are issued. Next, Marshall would prefer that Jefferson 
issue the commissions in the first place (a value of two). In this 
9
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scenario, the Court’s power is not expanded, but the justices of the 
peace are given their commissions. Marshall’s second-to-least 
preferable outcome occurs when Jefferson does not issue the 
commissions, and Marshall rejects the mandamus (a value of one). 
The Supreme Court does not gain authority and the judgeships are 
not issued—both poor outcomes for Marshall. However, this is still 
better than the least preferable outcome, which occurs when 
Jefferson does not issue the commissions, Marshall upholds the 
mandamus, and then Jefferson overrules the Court (a value of zero). 
In this scenario, the judges are not appointed, and the Court becomes 
effectively obsolete by way of executive expansion. It is true that 
some Federalists may have seen this as a partial win due to the 
increase in executive authority and overall government influence, 
but Marshall, as a member of and advocate for the Supreme Court, 
certainly would not have preferred this outcome. 
With the payoffs established, this paper moves to review the 
rollback analysis of the three different game trees in the appendices 
to this paper. In all three appendices, Jefferson’s payoff is the first 
number in the set, and Marshall’s payoff is the second number. For 
example, in set (3,2), Jefferson receives the three and Marshall 
receives the two. The same goes for set (1,3), where Jefferson 
receives the one, and Marshall receives the three. 
 In Appendix A, the game tree has been structured from 
Jefferson’s point of view. As mentioned earlier, the dotted line 
denotes an information set that Jefferson does not have at the start 
of the game. From Jefferson’s perspective, starting with the last 
decision node, Jefferson knows that he would choose to overrule the 
mandamus, resulting in payoff (2,0). This line has been bolded to 
symbolize the selected choice, and any non-bolded lines have 
effectively been pruned from the game tree. Then Jefferson believes 
that Marshall is choosing between “Uphold → Overrule” and 
“Reject,” for a payoff of zero or one respectively. Here Jefferson 
believes Marshall will choose to reject, for it would result in a higher 
payoff for Marshall. Finally, Jefferson is deciding between “Issue” 
for a payoff of three or “Don’t Issue → Reject” for a payoff of four. 
Obviously, Jefferson will choose the higher payoff and opt to not 
issue the commissions and wait for Marshall to reject the 
mandamus. With the information that Jefferson has available to him, 
this is a highly rational decision. 
10
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However, with full information given to both players, the 
outcome of the game would change. In Appendix B, the game tree 
has been changed to reflect a game played with symmetric 
information. In this game, the first part of the rollback analysis 
remains the same. Jefferson would choose to overrule Marshall for 
outcome (2,0). Then, rationally, Marshall would choose to reject the 
mandamus and concurrently establish judicial review by way of 
declaring the Judiciary Act of 1793 unconstitutional for outcome 
(0,4). For Jefferson, the decision is now between issuing the 
commissions for outcome (3,2) and not issuing the commissions and 
receiving (0,4). In this scenario, Jefferson would clearly choose set 
(3,2) and opt to issue the commissions from at the commencement 
of the game. 
Finally, in Appendix C, is the game as played in reality. In 
this version of the game Jefferson does not know that Marshall can 
establish judicial review, so he will operate with the same rationality 
as Appendix A. He believes that he is choosing between “Issue” for 
payoff (3,2) and “Don’t Issue → Reject" for payoff (4,1). However, 
as previously discussed, Marshall is either granted a second-mover 
advantage via oral arguments, or he skillfully develops a new move 
and carefully conceals information about the move from Jefferson. 
Regardless of how or when Marshall accesses the information, 
Jefferson will choose to not issue the commissions and pursue 
outcome (4,1)—his best and most preferable choice. Then, Marshall 
will decide to reject the mandamus and establish judicial review and 
the game ends with payoff (0,4). In this way, Jefferson is quickly 
shifted from picking between his most preferable and second-most 
preferable choice, to receiving his least preferable payoff. 
Unbeknownst to the players at the time, the ramifications of 
Jefferson’s lack of information would be monumental to the 
establishment of today’s Supreme Court and would forever change 
the course of American history. 
 
Implications 
 
 The analysis of the strategic interaction between Jefferson 
and Marshall, as discussed above, provides us with a multitude of 
insights as basic as rethinking Marbury v. Madison and as deep as 
bettering our understanding of the inner workings of the American 
11
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government. First, this analysis offers a better understanding of 
Marshall, Jefferson, and the entirety of the Marbury v. Madison 
decision. This paper argues that Jefferson was not necessarily 
‘outfoxed’ by Marshall in their interaction, but that Marshall could 
have been granted a second-move advantage. Furthermore, this 
paper can help us better understand inter-institutional relationships 
and strategies. As detailed above, it is clear that governmental 
bodies communicate both explicitly and implicitly and, in doing do, 
help shape the future of policy in the United States. In studying 
interactions such as Jefferson and Marshall’s in the early nineteenth 
century, we can better understand our current government and the 
way that politicians connect in the political sphere. Similarly, this 
analysis presents demonstrable evidence that even non-elected 
officials, such as Supreme Court justices, often strategize in a way 
that is most characteristic of elected officials. In this analysis, 
Marshall clearly understood that he was pitted against Jefferson and 
decided to play a political game in which the Supreme Court was to 
come out on top. Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, this paper 
provides insight into the decision-making process of Supreme Court 
justices. In analyzing Marshall’s strategic choices throughout the 
course of the game, we can see that he was explicitly influenced by 
his environment. He clearly considered that Jefferson and the Anti-
Federalists were his opponents and countered Jefferson accordingly. 
This fact is not to be taken lightly. If we extrapolate this 
understanding into modern-day politics, then it is important to 
recognize that Supreme Court justices can be manipulated by their 
environment. Their decisions are not made in a vacuum—if enough 
pressure exists, it is possible to alter their verdicts and thus influence 
the entire nation.  
 Ultimately, the purpose of the presented paper is to 
encourage a rethinking of the strategic interaction between Marshall 
and Jefferson. This paper posits that Jefferson and Marshall were 
acutely aware of the fact that their decisions were an important 
indicator to future generations about how the government should 
and would function. They both desired, primarily, to uphold their 
institutional agenda and were only secondarily concerned with the 
true outcome of Marbury v. Madison in regard to the justices of the 
peace. Whereas Jefferson ended up with his least favorable 
outcome, however, Marshall became a historic champion of the 
12
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supreme Court. He very well may remain the figure in whose 
shadow judges will forever dwell.  Marshall’s victory over Jefferson 
in 1803 has long defined the supreme Court, and, with lessons 
learned from this paper, we know that the highly unstable and 
manipulable environment in which we all live will influence the 
future of decision-making in the Court. 
13
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